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RESTORATION OF CLAIM-OF-RIGHT INCOME AND
PERCENTAGE DEPLETION
BY ROBERT J. CASEY* AND JOHN A. CRAIG**
The most publicized aspect of the 1964 Revenue Act has been the across-
the-board rate reductions. Tax reductions are always attractive, for they
are capable of being translated into tangible benefits measurable in dollars
and cents. Little, however, has been said with respect to the problems which
will be created by the 1964 Act. There is an immediate consequence of the
current rate reduction program which should not be overlooked. This is the
problem of income received under claim of right without restriction as to its
use in a year of high tax rates and subsequently restored in a low tax rate
year. A deduction in the year of restoration clearly will not adequately com-
pensate a taxpayer who has included the entire amount of the restoration in
income during the high rate year of receipt.
Prior to the 1954 Code, the only remedy available to a taxpayer required
to restore a claim of right income item in a year subsequent to its receipt
was the deduction of the amount restored in the year of restoration.' This
rule resulted in frequent inequities, because of changes in the tax rates, in
the taxpayer's taxable status, or in the law between the year of receipt and
the year of repayment. Notwithstanding the inequitable results produced,
the courts were nearly unanimous in restricting the deduction to the year of
repayment, often noting that the remedy lay before the legislature, not the
judiciary.
Congress enacted section 1341 of the 1954 Code to cure the inequities.
As with most tax legislation, this section cured existing problems, but created
others. To date, with tax rates unchanged since 1951, there has been little
litigation under this section. However, the reduction in rates will undoubtedly
fill this void.
The provisions of section 1341 are mandatory. In general they require
that the restorer of claim of right income either deduct the amount of the
restoration from income in the year of restoration, or compute the reduction
in tax for the year of original receipt which results solely from the exclusion
* B.A., 1941, Syracuse University; LL.B., 1949, Catholic University; member of
the law firm of Clark, Carr & Ellis, New York City, New York; member, New York
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American Bar Association Section of Taxation.
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of the claim of right income from gross income in such year, whichever
produces the lesser tax. Should a prior year exclusion result in a lower tax, the
overpayment with respect thereto must be treated as an overpayment for the
year of restoration.
2
2. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341 provides:
(a) General Rule.-If-
(1) an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable year (or
years) because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted right to such
item;
(2) a deduction is allowable for the taxable year because it was established
after the close of such prior taxable year (or years) that the taxpayer did not
have an unrestricted right to such item or to a portion of such item; and
(3) the amount of such deduction exceeds $3,000, then the tax imposed by
this chapter for the taxable year shall be the lesser of the following:
(4) the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
(5) an amount equal to-
(A) the tax for the taxable year computed without such deduction,
minus
(B) the decrease in tax under this chapter (or the corresponding pro-
visions of prior revenue laws) for the prior taxable year (or years) which
would result solely from the exclusion of such item (or portion thereof)
from gross income for such prior taxable year (or years).
For purposes of paragraph (5) (B), the corresponding provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939 shall be chapter 1 of such code (other than subchapter
E, relating to self-employment income) and Subchapter E of chapter 2 of such
code.
(b) Special Rules.-
(1) If the decrease in tax ascertained under subsection (a) (5) (B) exceeds
the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year (computed without the de-
duction) such excess shall be considered to be a payment of tax on the last day
prescribed by law for the payment of tax for the taxable year, and shall be
refunded or credited in the same manner as if it were an overpayment for such
taxable year.
(2) Subsection (a) does not apply to any deduction allowable with respect
to an item which was included in gross income by reason of the sale or other
disposition of stock in trade of the taxpayer (or other property of a kind which
would properly have been included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand
at the close of the prior taxable year) or property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. This
paragraph shall not apply if the deduction arises out of refunds or repayments
with respect to rates made by a regulated public utility (as defined in section
1503(c) without regard to paragraph (2) thereof) if such refunds or repay-
ments are required to be made by the Government, political subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality referred to in such section, or by an order of a court, or
are made in settlement of litigation or under threat or imminence of litigation.
This paragraph shall not apply if the deduction arises out of payments or repay-
ments made pursuant to a price redetermination provision in a subcontract entered
into before January 1, 1958, between persons other than those bearing the rela-
tionship set forth in section 267(b), if the subcontract containing the price
redetermination provision is subject to statutory renegotiation and secton 1481
(relating to mitigation of effect of renegotiation of Government contracts) does
not apply to such payment or repayment solely because such payment or repay-
ment is not paid
(3) If the tax imposed by this chapter for the taxable year is the amount
determined under subsection (a) (5), then the deduction referred to in subsection
(a) (2) shall not be taken into account for any purpose of this subtitle other
than this section
(4) For purposes of determining whether paragraph (4) or paragraph (5)
of subsection (a) applies-
(A) in any case where the deduction referred to in paragraph (4)
of subsection (a) results in a net operating loss, such loss shall, for pur-
poses of computing the tax for the taxable year under such paragraph (4),
(Vol. 68
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The background of section 1341, its provisions, and its application to a
natural gas producer will be the subject of this Article.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
North American Oil v. Burnet3 established the claim of right doctrine.
The question presented was whether the net income derived from an oil
property was income to its owner in 1916 when collected by a court-appointed
receiver, or in 1917 when actually paid over to the owner. Throughout 1916
title to the property was challenged in district court proceedings. In 1917
judgment in that suit was entered in the owner's favor, and the monies col-
lected by the receiver paid over to it. The United States appealed; however,
the district court's judgment was affirmed in 1922. On these facts the Su-
preme Court held that the net profit earned by the property and collected
by the receiver in 1916 was income to the owner in 1917 stating:
If a taxpayer receives earnings under a claim of right and
without restriction as to its disposition, he has received income
which he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed
that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may
still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.
4
This sweeping language established the claim of right doctrine. More-
over, it disposed of the only issue before it. However, the Court felt constrained
to proceed, adding the following gratuitous statement:
If in 1922 the Government had prevailed and the company had
been obliged to refund the profits received in 1917, it would have
been entitled to a deduction from the profits of 1922, not from those
of any earlier year.
5
be carried back to the same extent and in the same manner as is provided
under section 172; and
(B) in any case where the exclusion referred to in paragraph (5) (B)
of subsection (a) results in a net operating loss or capital loss for the prior
taxable year (or years), such loss shall, for purposes of computing the
decrease in tax for the prior taxable year (or years) under such paragraph
(5) (B), be carried back and carried over to the same extent and in the
same manner as is provided under section 172 or section 1212, except that
no carryover beyond the taxable year shall be taken into account.
(5) For purposes of this chapter, the net operating loss described in para-
graph (4) (A) of this subsection, or the net operating loss or capital loss de-
scribed in paragraph (4) (B) of this subsection, as the case may be, shall (after
the application of paragraph (4) or (5) (B) of subsection (a) for the taxable
year) be taken into account under section 172 or 1212 for taxable years after
the taxable year to the same extent and in the same manner as-
(A) a net operating loss sustained for the taxable year, if paragraph
(4) of subsection (a) applied, or
(B) a net operating loss or capital loss sustained for the prior taxable
year (or years), if paragraph (5) (B) of subsection (a) applied.
3. 286 U.S. 417 (1932).
4. Id. at 424.
5. Id. at 425.
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Thus, the Court chose, not only to enunciate a fundamental legal principle,
but also to apply it to a factual situation not yet before it.
Close analysis of North American Oil, as well as the cases which followed
it, reveals that the inequities which ultimately led to the enactment of section
1341, were created, not out of the claim of right doctrine, but' by the applica-
tion of the above quoted dictum.
The claim of right doctrine was, and continues to be, a natural corollary
of the annual accounting period concept; a concept which requires that each
taxable year be treated as an entity, notwithstanding subsequent events.6 The
essential nature of the annual accounting system was best illustrated in
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. 7 There, the Supreme Court held that a tax-
payer was not entitled to postpone the payment of a tax until it was finally
determined whether or not an income producing transaction, occurring in the
year of receipt, in fact ultimately produced a gain.
8
Sanford & Brooks was concerned solely with the receipt and taxability
of income in a given year. Thus, insofar as North American Oil utilized the
annual accounting concept as authority for the claim of right doctrine to
govern taxable receipt issues, no criticism has been leveled at it. However,
its application to restoration issues has led not only to harsh and inequitable
results, but also vigoious dissents.
A combination of inequitable result and the dissenting voice appears in
United States v. Lewis." In 1944 Lewis received, and reported in income a
bonus of $22,000. Subsequently, it was determined that the bonus had been
incorrectly computed and Lewis was required to restore $11,000 to his
employer in 1946. Lewis then sued in the Court of Claims for a refund of his
1944 income tax.'0
A divided Court of Claims agreed with the taxpayer's contentions, relying
6. See Webster, The Claim of Right Doctrine: 1954 Version, 10 TAX L. REv. 381
(1955) ; Cavanaugh, Income Received Under Claim of Right as Affected by Section 1341,
P-H, OIL & GAS TAXES f 4013.
7. 282 U.S. 359 (1930).
8. The Court stated:
A taxpayer may be in receipt of net income in one year and not in another. The
net result of the two years, if combined in a single taxable period, might still
be a loss; but it has never been supposed that that fact would relieve him from
a tax on the first, or that it affords any reason for postponing the assessment
of a tax until the end of a lifetime, or for some other indefinite period, to
ascertain more precisely whether the final outcome of the period, or of a given
transaction, will be a gain or a loss. . . . It is the essence of any system of
taxation that it should produce revenue ascertainable, and payable to the gov-
ernment, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it practical to produce
a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assessment, and
collection capable of practical application.
Id. at 364-65.
9. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
10. 91 F. Supp. 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
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on its prior decisions in Greenwald v. United States" 'and Gargaro v. United
States12 both of which treated an amount subsequently restored, as having
been received "under a mistake of fact," and accordingly not income in the
year of receipt. In commenting on North American Oil, the court remarked:
We observe again that the Supreme Court language relied on
by the Government was obiter. The taxpayer in the American Oil
case received the money in 1917, and never paid it back. There
were five years of litigation during which its right to the money
was disputed, but it won the litigation and kept the money. The
court's statement as to what would have been the result if the tax-
payer had lost the litigation was, therefore, unnecessary to its
decision.' 3
The court then went on:
We remind, however, that in the instant case, as also in the
Greenwald and Gargaro cases, supra, the taxpayer, having received
the income, paid his tax, and did not ask the Government to wait
for its revenue until he had completed his litigation or resolved his
question otherwise. In all these cases the naked question has been
whether the Government should keep money paid to it upon the
mistaken assumption that the citizen had taxable income, when in
truth he did not have the income, since he was under a legal obli-
gation to return the money to his employer.'
4
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed,' tersely noting that:
Income taxes must be paid on income received for accrual
during an annual accounting period. . . . The "claim of right"
interpretation of the tax laws has long been used to give finality to
that period, and is now deeply rooted in the federal tax system....
We see no reason why the Court should depart from this well-
settled interpretation merely because it results in an advantage or
disadvantage to a taxpayer.' 6
It has been suggested that it would be more "equitable" to
reopen respondent's 1944 tax return. While this suggestion might
work to the advantage of this taxpayer, it could not be adopted as
a general solution because, in many cases, the three-year statute
of limitations would preclude recovery. I.R.S., Sec. 322(b). 17
Notwithstanding this emphatic affirmation of the North American Oil appli-
cation of the claim of right doctrine to subsequently restored income, this
11. 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. C1. 1944).
12. 73 F. Supp. 973 (Ct. C1. 1947).
13. 91 F. Supp. at 1020-21.
14. Id. at 1021-22. (Emphasis added.)
15. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
16. Id. at 592.
17. Id. at 592 n.1.
1964]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
time in Lewis, a proceeding actually presenting the question, Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented. In his dissent he indicated a preference for the Court of
Claims approach, stating:
Many inequities are inherent in the income tax. We multiply
them needlessly by nice distinctions which have no place in the
practical administration of the law. If the refund were allowed, the
integrity of the taxable year would not be violated. The tax would
be paid when due; but the Government would not be permitted to
maintain the unconscionable position that it can keep the tax after
it is shown that payment was made on money which was not income
to the taxpayer.18
While the matter thus seemed to have been set at rest, the Supreme
Court shortly was faced with the conflicting views of the second and sixth
circuits in Healy v. Commissioner.19 Again it adhered to the North American
Oil concept of claim of right income, restricting the deduction to the year of
restoration. Commenting on the inequitable results arising from the treatment
as income of an amount which eventually turns out not to be income, the
Court stated:
Congress has enacted an annual accounting system under which
income is counted up at the end of each year. It would be disruptive
of an orderly collection of the revenue to rule that the accounting
must be done over again to reflect events occurring after the year
for which the accounting is made, and would violate the spirit of
the annual accounting system. This basic principle cannot be changed
simply because it is of advantage to a taxpayer or to the Govern-
ment in a particular case that a different rule be followed.
20
As before, Mr. Justice Douglas noted his dissent, but without a written
opinion.
Thus, from the outset the Supreme Court consistently rejected a "trans-
actional approach" to the problem of restored claim of right income, an ap-
proach which was urged by the taxpayers in Lewis and Healy, and which was
adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas in his Lewis dissent, as well as by the Court
of Claims.
Essentially, the transactional approach acknowledges that sometimes an
onerous result is produced when the annual accounting concept is applied
to a transaction spanning two or more tax years. Its proponents concede that
the claim of right doctrine applies to the year of original receipt, and accord-
ingly concede that the claim of right item received constitutes income. How-
18. Id. at 592.
19. 345 U.S. 278 (1953), affirming, 194 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1952), reversing, 194
F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1952).
20. 345 U.S. at 284-85. (Emphasis added.)
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ever, with respect to the year of restoration they argue that once the facts are
fully known, the accounting treatment originally afforded the item on receipt
must be retroactively altered, and the fact of repayment must be given effect
by treating the entire transaction on a unitary basis.2 1 Under this unitary
theory, repayment in a later year automatically creates a deduction which
relates back to, and is permitted for, the year of original receipt.
Thus, two mutually exclusive remedies were available to Congress to
alleviate the hardships arising from the treatment afforded a restored claim
of right item by existing law. On the one hand, Congress could have adopted
the "transactional approach," and provided that repayment of a claim of
right item in a subsequent year creates an automatic deduction which is to
be related back, and taken in the year of original receipt. On the other hand,
Congress could have chosen to preserve the integrity of the annual accounting
period, and thereby permit a reduction in tax only for the year of restoration,
either by way of a recomputation of tax for the year of receipt, or by way of
a deduction in the year of restoration. By enacting section 1341 Congress
chose the latter course.
SECTION 1341
Congress acted in 1954 by enacting section 1341 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. As stated in its committee reports, it acted to remedy the
inequities arising from existing law.
22
Ignoring the transactional approach, Congress premised section 1341
on the annual accounting period concept. Thus, the remedy provided was
couched solely in terms of a reduction in tax for the taxable year of restora-
tion. Moreover, there were no elections or alternatives. The section was
mandatory for all cases falling within its ambit.
Thus, under section 1341 a taxpayer restoring a claim of right item
in a taxable year subsequent to its receipt, must give effect to any restoration
in excess of $3,000 either: (1) by deducting the repayment from gross income
in the year of restoration, or (2) by excluding the restored item from gross
income in the taxable year of receipt, treating any reduction in tax attributable
to such exclusion as an overpayment for the taxable year of restoration,
whichever method produced a lesser tax.
The mandatory provisions of section 1341 are operative where it is
established: 1. That an item was included in gross income for a prior taxable
year, or years, because it appeared that the taxpayer had an unrestricted
21. Surrey & Warren, The Income Tax Project of the American Law Institute:
Gross Income, Deductions, Accounting, Gains and Losses, Cancellation of Indebtedness,
66 HARV. L. REv. 798 (1953).
22. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 86, 294 (1954) ; S. RE. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118, 451 (1954).
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right thereto; and 2. That a deduction is allowable for the taxable year, be-
cause it was established after the close of the prior taxable year (or years)
that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such item (or portion
thereof) ; and 3. That the amount of the deduction exceeds $3,000.
In the event these requirements are met, the section provides that the
tax for the year of restoration shall be the lesser of: 1. The tax for such tax-
able year computed with such deduction (an (a)(4) computation), or 2.
The tax for such taxable year computed without such deduction, minus the
decrease in tax for the prior taxable year (or years) resulting solely from the
exclusion of such item (or portion thereof) from gross income for such prior
taxable year (or years) (an (a) (5) computation). No deduction is allowed
for inventory items, stock in trade, or property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of business. The House version of H.R.
8300 made no exception to this sweeping exclusion. However, the Senate
excepted from this exclusionary provision, refunds or repayments made by a
regulated public utility, if required to be made by the Government, political
subdivision, agency or instrumentality referred to in 1954 Code section
1503(c), 28 or if required to be made by an order of a court, or in settlement
of litigation, or under threat of imminence of litigation.
24
Also excepted from the exclusionary provision are refunds made pur-
suant to a price redetermination provision in a subcontract, entered into
before January 1, 1958, where the parties are not related, and even though
the subcontract is subject to statutory renegotiation; there is no mitigation
of the effect of the price redetermination because the refunds are not made
to a governmental agency.
25
The section contains a rather complicated set of rules governing net
operating losses, and capital losses. As originally enacted, section 1341 con-
tained no limiting language such as is presently found in subsections (b) (3),
(4), and (5). In 1958 subsection (b) (3) was added in its present form, to
make clear that, where the tax for the year of restoration was computed
under an (a) (5) computation, the deduction otherwise allowable for the
23. Statement of Independent Natural Gas Assoc. of Am. Re: Provisions of the
Int. Rev. Codes of 1954, H.R. 8300, Senate Fin. Comm. Hearings on H.R. 8300, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1284 (1954); Statement of Comm. on Taxation of The Am.
Gas Assoc., New York, N.Y. on H.R. 8300, Senate Fin. Comm. Hearings on H.R. 8300,
83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 1232-33 (1954) ; Statement of Edison Elec. Institute, New
York, N.Y. Re: H.R. 8300, Senate Fin. Comm. Hearings on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong.,
2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1049 (1954).
24. The provision permitting rate refunds, occasioned by court order, settlement
of litigation, or threat or imminence of litigation, to come within the operation of section
1341 was added by 'the Technical Amendments Act of 1958, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1341(b) (2), 72 Stat. 1647 (1958). This provision is effective with respect to taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1957.
25. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341(b) (2), 72 Stat. 1647 (1958).
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year of restoration was not to be taken into account for any other purpose. 26
Thus, the section prohibits using the restored item in computing a net operat-
ing loss for the year of restoration.
27
In 1962 Congress added subsections (b)(4) and (b)(5) to section
1341.28 Essentially, these subsections provide that, for the purpose of deter-
mining whether an (a) (4) or an (a) (5) adjustment produces the lesser
tax, net operating losses generated in the year of restoration are to be carried
back as well as over, but not beyond the taxable year of restoration. They
further provide that, for purposes of computing the taxpayer's ultimate tax
liability, net operating losses produced in the year of restoration by virtue
of an (a) (4) computation are to be treated as net operating losses sustained
in such taxable year, and net operating losses and capital losses generated
in the year of receipt by virtue of an (a) (5) computation are to be treated
as sustained in such year.
It should be noted that the provisions of subsection (b) (4), dealing
with net operating losses and capital losses produced under an (a) (5) com-
putation, are almost identical with those contained in the Treasury Regu-
lations. 29 Thus, to this extent, the 1962 amendment codified existing law.
For the most part, the provisions of section 1341 are clear. Consideration
of the problem, and the method chosen to remedy it indicate that the job
was adequately done. Nevertheless, certain questions have been raised which,
as yet, have not been answered. 0 It is proposed to focus on one question of
immediate importance to the instant discussion; i.e., what is the nature of
the "deduction" referred to in section 1341 (a) (2).
Section 1341 (a) (2) requires that a deduction for the restored item be
allowable because "it was established after the close of such prior taxable
year (or years) that the taxpayer did not have an unrestricted right to such
item." Thus, the question is: What is the nature of the "deduction" for
restored claim of right income referred to in section 1341 ?
Webster discusses sections 162(a)(1), covering losses incurred in a
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1341 (b) (3), 72 Stat. 1647 (1958).
27. S. REP. No. 1383, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
28. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1341(b) (4), (b)(5), 76 Stat. 1142 (1962).
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(d) (4) (ii) (1957).
For the purpose of determining the decrease in tax for the prior taxable year
(or years) which "would result from the exclusion from gross income of the
item included under a claim of right, the exclusion of such item shall be given
effect not only in the prior taxable year in which it was included in gross
income but in all prior taxable years affected by the inclusion of the item (for
example, prior taxable years affected by a net operating loss carryback or carry-
over or capital loss carryover). (Emphasis added.)
30. See Webster, op. cit. supra note 4, at 387-97; Cavanaugh, op. cit. supra note 4,
at 4276-78; Am. Bar Assoc., Section of Taxation, Supplemental Statement Filed with
the Senate Fin. Comm. in Connection with Hearings on H.R. 8300, Senate Fin. Comm.
Hearings on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 494-95 (1954).
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trade or business, 165(c) (2), transactions entered into for profit, and 212,
ordinary and necessary expenses paid for the production of income.31 He
suggests that G.C.M. 1673032 ruled that a deduction for claim of right
income lay in the year of restoration, and not in the year of receipt.
33
In any event, Webster concludes that the fountainhead for the "deduction"
is North American Oil and Lewis. The authors concur in this conclusion.
This conclusion is borne out by the Committee Reports of both Houses
which accompanied H.R. 8300, and which acknowledge that under existing
law a taxpayer required to restore claim of right income is entitled to a
deduction in the year of restitution, citing as the only authority the Lewis
case, which relied solely on North American Oil3
4
THE NATURAL GAS PRODUCER AND SECTION 1341
An interesting problem is raised when section 1341 is applied to a
natural gas producer. Assume a natural gas producer is ordered by the
Federal Power Commission to refund to a pipeline customer X dollars,
representing overcharges collected by the producer on the sale of natural gas
derived from its feehold properties in a prior year. Further assume that the
producer included these overcharges in gross income in the year of original
receipt under a claim of right.
At this point, the question is, whether the 1341 "deduction" must be
reduced by percentage depletion previously claimed with respect to the
overcharges in the year of original receipt, for purposes of either a section
1341 (a) (4) or (a) (5) computation.
The clear and unambiguous language of section 1341 neither requires,
nor, in fact permits any adjustment on account of previously claimed per-
centage depletion. Moreover, assuming resort to the legislative history is
necessary, the committee reports of both Houses expressly preclude any such
adjustment. Finally, it is submitted that any adjustment on account of
previously claimed percentage depletion would violate the annual accounting
concept, which Congress took great care to preserve within the framework
of section 1341.
Inasmuch as the producer is required, by direction of a federal regulatory
agency, to refund the overcharges, it is clear that the provisions of section
1341 are operative. Furthermore, it is clear that, unless a title dispute with
respect to the producing properties is involved, the "deduction" is not one
such as considered by the Tax Court in Maurice P. O'Meara.3 5 There the
31. Webster, op. cit. supra note 4, at 390-9.
32. XV-1 Cum. BULL. 179 (1936).
33. Id. at 181.
34. See 57 F. Supp. 569 (Ct. Cl. 1944).
35. 8 T.C. 622 (1947), involving a title dispute in which the recipient of the claim
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court concluded that, inasmuch as the recipient of the claim of right item
ultimately was determined never to have been the owner of an economic
interest in the minerals in place, or of the depletable interest therein, he was
never entitled to depletion thereon, and consequently must include in income
for the year of restoration the previously allowed percentage depletion allow-
ance. Finally, it is clear that we are not dealing with the lease bonus restora-
tion situation, where depletion was claimed and allowed in advance of an
extraction of minerals which extraction in fact never occurred. 6
A careful reading of section 1341(a) indicates that the focal point of
the problem is the nature of the item included in gross income for a prior
taxable year under a claim of right. Thus, section 1341(a) provides that if
an item was included in gross income for a prior year, and a deduction is
allowable for the taxable year, then the tax for the taxable year is to be the
lesser of:
1. The tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction; or
2. An amount equal to the tax for the taxable year without such deduc-
tion, minus the decrease in tax for the prior taxable year resulting
solely from the exclusion of such item from gross income for such
prior taxable year.
In effect this language, which utilizes interchangeably the phrase "item
included in gross income in a prior year," and the term "deduction," states
that the amount to be excluded, either under an (a) (5) or (a) (4) com-
putation, is the amount which was previously included in gross income under
a claim of right.
As previously noted, this reasoning conforms with North American Oil,
and its insistence on a close adherence to the annual accounting concept;
i.e., the income originally received continues to be income, even though it is
subsequently determined that all or a portion thereof must be restored. In
this context, the "deduction" allowable must be synonymous with the item
originally included in gross income in the year of receipt.
This conclusion is further evidenced by the statutory language appearing
in subsection (a) (5) (B), which provides that the decrease in tax for the
prior taxable year is that decrease which results solely from the exclusion of
such item from gross income for such prior taxable year.
There are those who would disagree with the conclusion that no adjust-
ment on account of previously claimed depletion is necessary under a section
of right item was subsequently adjudged not the owner of the property.
36. See Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275 (1944), where the Court held such




1341 computation.3 7 However, it is submitted that they have overlooked or
misconstrued the meaning of the term "gross income" as used in section
1341; or they have erroneously applied section 1305(b) to situations where
there is no dispute as to title-specifically, the sale of natural gas as an
inventory item.
"Gross income" is a technical term, which has a well-defined meaning
for tax purposes. Thus, Treasury Regulations section 1.61-3(a), as did its
predecessor under the 1939 Code, Regulations 118, section 39.22(a)-5,
defines "gross income" from business as:
In a manufacturing, merchandising, or mining business, "gross
income" means the total sales, less the cost of goods sold, plus any
income from investments and from incidental or outside operations
or sources. Gross income is determined without subtraction of deple-
tion allowances based on a percentage of income, and without sub-
traction of selling expenses, losses, or other items not ordinarily
used in computing cost of goods sold.
38
One of the cardinal rules of statutory construction is that words with a
fixed legal meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense.8 9 Thus,
Congress is presumed to have meant the term "gross income," as used in
section 1341, to have the same meaning as given in the definition contained
in the Treasury Regulations previously promulgated.
Revenue Ruling 60-34440 is in complete accord with this construction.
The definition of gross income contained therein is identical with that set
forth in Regulations section 1.61-3(a). The holding that "lifting costs"
must be subtracted from gross sales to arrive at gross income points up the
very distinction which is now being made, i.e., percentage depletion is not
a "cost of goods sold," and consequently, does not reduce gross-receipts for
the purpose of arriving at gross income.
Accordingly, any construction of section 1341 which would exclude
previously claimed percentage depletion from the amount of the "deduction"
in the current year under an (a) (4) computation, or from the amount of
the exclusion in a prior year under an (a) (5) computation is erroneous,
inasmuch as it substitutes the term "taxable income" for the term "gross
income." This is clearly contrary to the express statutory directive.
Moreover, there is no relationship whatsoever between percentage deple-
tion and the statutory term "gross income." In the case of oil and gas wells
37. See Cavanaugh, op. cit. supra note 4.
38. (Emphasis added.)
39. See Real Estate Title Co. v. United States, 309 U.S. 73 (1940), where the
Court held the taxpayer to the definition contained in Treasury Regulation 74 of the
term "allowance for absolescence."
40. Rev. Rul. 60-344; 1960-2 Cum. BULL. 186.
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the Code provides for a percentage depletion rate of 272 per cent "of the
gross income from the property."'41 The term "gross income from the prop-
erty" is a word of art, separate and distinct in its meaning from the term
"gross income." For example, Regulations section 1.613-3(a) provides that,
in the case of oil and gas wells, "gross income from the property" means
the amount for which the taxpayer sells the oil and gas in the immediate
vicinity of the well, in other words, the taxpayer's "gross receipts." On the
other hand, as was demonstrated in Revenue Ruling 60-344, lifting costs
must be subtracted from gross receipts (gross income from the property) to
arrive at "gross income."
Thus, it can be seen that "gross income from the porperty," as is "gross
receipts," is a broader concept than the term "gross income." Had Congress
intended to predicate its allowance of a deduction under section 1341, either
by way of an (a) (4) or (a) (5) computation, upon the exclusion of an
amount previously included in gross receipts, it would have so provided.
Further, there is no support for the application of an inverse "tax
benefit" rule with respect to a section 1341 claim of right item. The Com-
missioner advanced such an argument unsuccessfully in the case of Maurice
P. O'Meara.
42
In that case the taxpayer, in 1936, acquired from Kelly a warranty
deed to certain oil properties. During 1937, he received and reported as
income, royalty payments on account of oil produced therefrom. Due to other
items, O'Meara's 1937 taxable year resulted in a net loss. Subsequently,
O'Meara was adjudged in unlawful possession of the properties, and in 1941
was required to pay over to the rightful owners the 1937 royalties. On his
1941 return O'Meara deducted the amount previously included in income
which he was forced to repay. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction,
contending:
that this deduction was properly disallowed, since petitioner's 1937
return showed a net loss and, although he included the royalties
in income for that year, they brought the Government no tax
benefit .... 4s
In rejecting this argument, the Tax Court stated:
A short form for stating the rule might thus be that the process
of establishing a basis for an income item consists, in effect, of
reporting it in the taxpayer's gross income for tax purposes. ...
But it is not the rule that in addition to reporting the item as
41. NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 613(a), (b).
42. 8 T.C. at 633-34.
43. Id. at 632.
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income, the effect must be to create a taxable situation and require
the payment of a tax. . . 44
Not only does this conform with the conclusions expressed in this Article
but also the express requirement of section 1341 ; i.e., merely that the item
must have been included in gross income in a prior year. Furthermore, the
theory upon which the Tax Court based its decision is identical to the
theory expressed in this Article. In discussing G.C.M. 16730,45 the court
stated:
No reference is made to the tax consequences of the original treat-
ment of the income, and no suggestion appears that the result is
limited to situations where a tax becomes collectible because of the
inclusion in gross income. If at this late date, such additional require-
ment should be imposed, it would seem at least to call for congres-
sional action . .. 46
Congress did consider the problem, and expressly rejected an "addi-
tional requirement" that a deduction for restored claim of right income
should be "limited to situations where a tax becomes collectible because of
the inclusion in gross income." No other conclusion may be drawn from
the language contained in section 1341.
Thus, any adjustment predicated on the theory that a tax must have
been paid with respect to either a portion, or all of the claim of right item
restored is untenable. This conclusion finds further support in the concluding
statement of the Tax Court:
Nor can respondent be sustained by the fortuitous circumstances
that this income turned out to have been subject to repayment be-
cause the petitioner was unsuccessful in the state court litigation.
Petitioner's obligation to report the income in the prior year was
unavoidable, it was so reported; and such treatment was proper.
The royalties were claimed as of right with every apparent prospect
that they would be retained. North American Oil Consolidated v.
Burnet, 286 U.S. 417. We are not, and the petitioner was not, at
liberty to look beyond the facts as they stood at the end of the
year. Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281.
Under these circumstances, for every tax purpose, the 1937 income
from these royalties was the property of the petitioner. His inclu-
sion of them in his gross income gave him a basis for gain or loss.
He has now suffered that loss and, because he must be granted the
opportunity to recover the basis so established, the deduction should
have been allowed.47
44. Id. at 633. (Emphasis added.)
45. XV-1, CUM. BULL. 179 (1936) (a ruling involving the restoration of claim of
right income).
46. 8 T.C. at 633. (Emphasis added.)
47. Id. at 634. (Emphasis added.)
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The above statement is as clearly applicable under section 1341, as it was
at the time of the O'Meara decision in 1947. It recognizes and preserves, as
does 1341, the annual accounting period concept.
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
It is submitted that the unambiguous language of section 1341 precludes
any reference to the legislative history. Nonetheless, assuming an analysis
of congressional intent is necessary for a proper construction of section 1341,
not only does it support the conclusions set forth above, but also it expressly
prohibits any adjustment on account of restored claim of right income except
the exclusion of the claim of right item from gross income, either in the
year of restoration by way of an (a) (4) computation or in the prior year
of receipt by way of an (a) (5) computation.
In this respect, the Senate report expressly provides:
If the taxpayer included an item in gross income in one taxable
year, and in a subsequent taxable year he becomes entitled to a
deduction because the item or a portion thereof is no longer subject
to his unrestricted use, and the amount of the deduction is in excess
of $3,000, the tax for the subsequent year is reduced by either the
tax attributable to the deduction or the decrease in the tax for the
prior year attributable to the removal of the item, whichever is
greater. Under the rule of the Lewis case (340 U.S. 590 (1951)),
the taxpayer is entitled to a deduction only in the year of repay-
ment.
4 s
In effect, the legislative history merely repeats the statutory provisions, i.e.,
the relief to be granted under section 1341 is measured by either deducting
the item previously included in gross income in the taxable year of restora-
tion, or by reducing the tax for the taxable year by the tax attributable to
the removal of the item from gross income in the year of receipt.
Moreover, the language of the committee report specifically refers to
existing law in that it recognizes under the North American Oil doctrine that
a taxpayer required to restore previously included claim of right income is
"entitled to a deduction" therefor because such income "is no longer subject
to his unrestricted use." It is interesting to note that the legislative history
does not allude to the creation of any new deduction on account of section
1341, but rather remedies the then existing requirement that a deduction on
account of any such restoration could only be measured by its effect in the
taxable year of repayment.
With respect to an (a) (5) computation, the legislative history expressly
48. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118, 451 (1954). (Emphasis added.)
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precludes any adjustment if such year is otherwise closed by limitations,
providing:
In computing the tax reduction for the prior taxable year attrib-
utable to the removal of the item in question, if the earlier year
would otherwise be closed, no other items may be adjusted. How-
ever, to the extent that adjusted gross income or taxable income
may be changed, items such as the medical and charitable deduc-
tions which are dependent upon income may also be affected.
49
In the light of the express provision of section 1341 (a)(5)(B), it is
questionable whether resort to the legislative history providing for an adjust-
ment on account of items such as the medical and charitable deductions is
permissible. Subsection (a)(5)(B) states that the decrease in tax for the
prior taxable year is that which results "solely from the exclusion of such
item ... from gross income," and in no way leaves room for an interpretation
such as is contained in the committee report.
Nonetheless, assuming for the sake of argument, that the committee
report is controlling, in this respect it emphatically states that "no other items
may be adjusted."50 As an exception to this restriction, it suggests that items
which are dependent upon "adjusted gross income" or "taxable income"
may be changed. It is submitted that there is no relationship whatsoever
between either "adjusted gross income" or "taxable income" and the allow-
ance for percentage depletion.
Both "adjusted gross income" and "taxable income" are statutory con-
cepts, being defined in sections 62 and 63, respectively, of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code. Thus, under the rule of statutory construction alluded to
previously, they are presumed to have been used in their technical sense.
In this respect the definition of "adjusted gross income" contained in section
62 makes clear such term is pertinent only in the case of individuals, stating
such term to mean "gross income minus the following deductions."' 51 There-
after, follow various enumerated deductions, no one of which is dependent
upon "adjusted gross income."
However, Regulations section 1.62-1 (a) expressly provides that:
Adjusted gross income is used as the basis for the determination of
the following:
(1) The optional tax if adjusted gross income is less than $5,000
(under section 3) ;
(2) The amount of the standard deduction (under section 141);
(3) The limitation on the amount of the deduction for charitable
contributions (under section 170 (b) (1))
49. Id. at 452. (Emphasis added.)
50. Ibid.
51. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 62 (adjusted gross income defined).
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(4) The limitation on the amount of the deduction for medical and
dental expenses (under section 213) ; and
(5) In certain cases, the limitation on the deduction for expenses
of care of certain dependents (under section 214).
Thus, it is clear that, in the case of individuals, any effect which the
exclusion of an amount restored in subsequent years would have upon ad-
justed gross income in prior years, due to a 1341 recomputation for such prior
years, in no way would affect such individual's percentage depletion allow-
ance for such earlier years, since such allowance is not dependent on "ad-
justed gross income."
"Taxable income," as defined by section 63(a) of the Code, means:
"gross income, minus the deductions allowed by this chapter, other than the
standard deduction allowed by part IV (sec. 141 and following)." Thus,
in the case of corporations, taxable income is equal to gross income minus
all allowable deductions. While in the case of corporations there is no single
provision enumerating deductible items limited by taxable income, an analysis
of the Code and Regulations reveals only the following: (1) Contributions-
limited to 5% of taxable income ;52 (2) Net operating loss ;5 (3) Dividends
received deductions--85% of taxable income ;54 (4) Dividends paid on public
utility preferred stock-26.9% of taxable income; 55 (5) Special deductions
for Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations;58 and (6) Foreign Tax
Credit.57 Nowhere can there be found a limitation on the percentage depletion
allowance which is based on taxable income.58 In point of fact, none exists.
Furthermore, the legislative history which accompanied the enactment
of section 1341 in no way vitiates any of the above conclusions. In fact, it
indirectly supports the proposition that no adjustment on account of previ-
ously claimed depletion is permitted to an (a) (4) and (a) (5) computation,
inasmuch as in years closed by limitation it expressly precludes any such
adjustment.
The Senate committee report also states that section 1341 is available
to a transferee. In this respect it states:
The section will apply to cases of transferee liability such as Arrow-
smith v. Commissioner (344 U.S. 6 (1952)). Thus, while the deduc-
tion in the current year is capital in nature, the taxpayer is not
52. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 170(b) (2).
53. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 172.
54. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 246(b) (1).
55. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 247.
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 922.
57. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 904.
58. But see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 613(a) (limiting percentage depletion to
50% of the taxpayer's "taxable income from the property").
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deprived of all relief because his tax is reduced at least to the
extent of the tax attributable to the prior inclusion.59
It has been suggested that this language, which incorporates the Arrowsmith
decision, could be construed as limiting any 1341 deduction to the amount
of the claim of right item which was actually included in taxable income.
However, this interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the express language
of the section, the aforementioned statement of the Senate committee report
which incorporates the North American Oil doctrine into the statutory frame-
work, as well as existing law as represented by the O'Meara case.
In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner6 ° a transferee of a corporation received
prior taxable years partial distributions by way of liquidation, reporting
them in his tax return as capital gains. Subsequently, a judgment was ren-
dered against the corporation and against the shareholder. The Supreme
Court applied the North American Oil doctrine and permitted the taxpayer
a deduction in the year in which the judgment was paid, limiting such
deduction, however, to a capital loss. This holding is in complete accord
with the present statutory scheme under section 1341, since the taxpayer
reflected the original distributions in his tax return as capital transactions. 6'
Thus, the nature of the original inclusion being capital, it follows that
any such exclusion must also represent a capital transaction. However, in
the case of the restoration by a natural gas producer of overcharges previ-
ously included in gross income under a claim of right, the transaction origi-
nally produced ordinary income, and consequently, upon restoration produces
an ordinary loss. Had Congress intended the Arrowsmith doctrine to apply
in other than capital situations, it could have easily made such provisions.
The fact that it was aware of the capital gain problem indicates it considered
analogous problems dealing with restoration of claim right items, and rejected
them.
TREASURY REGULATIONS
The Regulations promulgated under section 1341 generally adhere to
the provisions of the Code. Thus, Treasury Regulation 1.1341-1(d) (2) (i)
provides, for purposes of determining the decrease in tax for prior taxable
years, that:
The amount to be excluded from gross income for the prior taxable
year (or years) in determining the decrease in tax under Section
1341(a) (5) (B) and paragraph (b)(1)(ii) of this section shall
be the amount restored in the taxable year, but shall not exceed the
amount included in gross income in the prior taxable year (or years)
59. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 118, 452 (1954).
60. 344 U.S. 6 (1952).
61. See Frederick R. Bauer, 15 T.C. 850, 878 (1950).
[Vol. 68
CLAIM-OF-RIGHT INCOME
under the claim of right to which the deduction for the restoration
is attributable, . .6.2
It is interesting to note that the above quoted Regulation, as does section
1341 of the Code, looks to the amount included in gross income for the
year of receipt of the claim of right item, and limits the amount solely by
the amount of the restoration, for purposes of determining the decrease in
tax under an (a) (5) computation. As previously noted, this was the con-
gressional intent, and conforms with the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court in North American Oil, Lezvis and Healy.
However, Regulation 1.1341-1(d) (4) (ii) goes further and provides:
No item other than the exclusion of the income previously included
under a claim of right can be considered in computing the amount
of decrease in tax if reconsideration of such other item is prevented
by the operation of any provision of the internal revenue laws or
any other rule of law. However, if the amounts of other items are
dependent upon the amount of adjusted gross income, taxable in-
come, or net income (such as charitable contributions, foreign tax
credit, deductions for depletion, and net operating loss), appropriate
adjustment shall be made as part of the computation of the decrease
in tax.
6 3
It is submitted that this section of the Regulations is invalid, or at best,
meaningless, when it states by way of implication that percentage depletion
is "dependent upon the amount of adjusted gross income, taxable income,
or net income .... "4 As fully explained above, there is no relationship
whatsoever between percentage depletion and "adjusted gross income,"
"taxable income," or "net income." Furthermore, the Regulations have
attempted to read into section 1341 an item which is not contained in the
legislative history, i.e., that portion of the Regulations which incorporate
within the parenthetical expression "deductions for depletion.
'65
Finally, it is submitted that the section is clear and unambiguous on
its face, requiring that the decrease in tax be measured solely by the effect
of excluding the claim of right item from gross income in the year of its
original receipt. Thus, the same prohibition against resort to the legislative
history is applicable with respect to the Regulations as is applicable to the
Code.
With respect to the Regulations under section 1341, it should be noted
that amendments have been proposed thereto, 66 which purport to conform
62. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1341-1(d) (2) (i). (Emphasis added.)
63. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1341-1(d) (4) (ii). (Emphasis added.)
64. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1341-1(d) (4) (ii).
65. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1341-1(d) (4) (ii).




existing Regulations to section 5 of the Act of October 23, 1963 (76 Stat.
1142), which amended Section 1341(b) with respect to net operating loss
carryovers and carrybacks.
CONCLUSION
In summary, it is submitted that no adjustment may be made under
section 1341, either with respect to an (a) (4) or an (a) (5) computation,
on account of percentage depletion previously claimed in the year of receipt.
Primarily, any such adjustment is precluded by a strict application of the
annual accounting period concept as formulated in North American Oil and
subsequently adhered to by the Supreme Court in Lewis and Healy. As noted,
this concept is firmly incorporated in section 1341 by virtue of the statutory
approach. Moreover, a careful reading of the section makes plain that the
only adjustment permitted is that which arises out of the exclusion of the
claim of right item restored from gross income either in the year of restoration
or in the year of original receipt.
Finally, assuming resort to the legislative history is necessary, it is clear
that the congressional intent was to prohibit any other adjustment. In this
respect Regulation 1.1341-1 (d) (4) (ii) is obviously 'invalid.
